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Abstract 
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to make the distinction between the investment 
opportunity set of real assets versus portfolio securities. We perform a large scale formal 
investigation of the investment opportunity set in global acquisitions based on ownership type over 
the period of 1985 – 2012. Compared to private acquirers, government acquirers have a much 
reduced investment opportunity set. Government acquirers invest in fewer target nations and 
industries, settle for smaller stakes, invest in countries with lower quality legal institutions and in 
nations with which political relations are more positive and see a 50% higher deal failure rate.  
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I. Introduction 
 
 The notion of investment opportunity set plays a key role in finance, both in theory and 
empirics.  In portfolio investment, investment opportunity set defines the efficient portfolio 
frontier, which in turn helps generate the capital market line and capital asset pricing model, etc. 
The size of the investment opportunity set underlies the gains from diversification, from expanding 
to international stocks, to investing in nontraditional assets. It is generally acknowledged that 
investors gain from a greater investment set, while reducing the investment opportunity set causes 
a reduction in investors’ wealth and an increase in risk. Examples of changes in size include the 
expansion of the investment opportunity set through international diversification across exchanges 
in different countries, and the reduction of this set for foreign investors to a restricted list of 
‘investible’.   
 Our understanding of the role of investment opportunity set in real assets, however, is not 
as well developed.  This is, to a large extent, due to the fact that the real asset opportunity set is 
more complex.  For a multinational firm domiciled in country ‘x’ desiring to invest in foreign 
country ‘y’, either through direct investment or acquisition, its investment opportunity set would 
depend on several factors.  First, there is the issue of whether the size of the investment opportunity 
set depends on the identity of the home country of the multinational firm, i.e., could a multinational 
firm from country ‘x’ be allowed in invest in the real assets of country ‘y’? Will they be excluded 
from investing in a particular set of industries? These constraints on investment opportunity set, 
which could be country pair and country-industry pair specific, differ from the broad restriction 
on portfolio investment in which ‘investible’ applies to all foreign investors. Second, the 
ownership type or affiliation of the foreign firm could matter. Constraints to invest in country ‘y’ 
may apply differently depending on whether the multinational firm is owned by private individuals 
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or affiliated with state agencies of country ‘x’.  Third, unlike portfolio investment that involves a 
fraction of a company, real asset investment often requires full or majority control. The real asset 
investment opportunity set could be reduced if the foreign firm faces constraints on the percentage 
of ownership. The limit on ownership could affect the multinational’s ability to restructure, to take 
risks, or to engage in innovative activities. Fourth, if completion of a transaction is highly 
uncertain, and thus, reducing its expected value and rendering the opportunity set as probabilistic, 
the result is also a reduction in the real asset opportunity set.   
 These differences between portfolio investment and real asset investment generate several 
testable hypotheses.  The real asset opportunity set is country to country specific; it is also country-
industry specific, and ownership type specific. It is further reduced from the limitations on the 
percentage of ownership, and from greater uncertainty, where risk of failure to complete the deal 
is greater.  As a result of the reduced investment opportunity set due to the these constraints, 
another empirical implication is that the more constrained the multinational is, either due to home 
country or ownership type, the more likely they would have to invest in less desirable real assets 
in the interior of the unconstrained real asset opportunity set.  That is, since these constrained 
multinationals have a much reduced investment opportunity set, empirically, they would be 
observed to invest in riskier real assets such as in countries that are less stable politically or more 
corrupt, and in countries where the cost of successful integration is higher due to cultural 
difference, etc.  
  Although foreign firms, particularly foreign government affiliated firms, are suspected of 
having less success in acquiring companies in another country, this impression derives mostly from 
anecdotal evidence involving a few high profile cases. In this paper, we perform, for the first time, 
a large scale formal investigation of the investment opportunity set in global acquisitions over the 
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period of 1985 – 2012. We provide empirical evidence on the extent that the investment 
opportunity set is reduced and the factors affecting the reduction. Our sample includes acquisitions 
by multinational firms from 149 countries in 134 target countries.  Although real asset investment 
may take either the form of direct foreign investment (FDI) or acquisition, and this choice is an 
interesting topic in itself, we choose to conduct our study on acquisitions by multinational firms.  
This choice is dictated by the need for a large sample in order to perform statistical tests and have 
greater confidence in the results.  
 We first focus on the empirical evidence regarding the size of the opportunity set for all 
firm ownership types (i.e., privately owned and government owned) depending on country 
characteristics. We find that relatively smaller target nations, less open target nations, and target 
nations with weaker legal protection are less likely to see cross-border merger activity regardless 
of ownership type.   
 We next examine if the ownership type of a firm is related to the investment opportunity 
set. Specifically, we compare government-affiliated (heretofore “government”) acquirers to 
private acquirers. This is an issue of practical importance as there are many large state-owned 
firms as remnants of state monopolies in former controlled economy countries.1 Our results 
indicate that government acquirers invest in fewer countries and fewer industries than their private 
counterparts. Specifically, 134 target nations have received at least 50 cross-border deals and 115 
of those target nations have received at least one cross-border acquisition from a government 
acquirer. Target nations differ with respect to the ratio of government cross-border deals to non-
government cross-border deals. For instance, Estonia and Bermuda see a ratio of government 
cross-border deals to non-government cross-border deals that is roughly an order of magnitude 
                                                 
1 In China, for instance, state owned firms account for 83% of total market capitalization for the country (Lee, 2007). 
4 
 
higher than China. Based on the Fama and French 49 industry classification, 49 (48) industries 
have received private (government) cross-border M&A activity. Overall, 18 of the 49 industries 
have received fewer than 10 government cross-border investments. Similar to private firms, 
government acquirers are less likely to invest across borders in smaller target nations but instead 
invest in target nations that are relatively less open and have weaker legal protections. However, 
the economic effect of this result is stronger for private acquirers than government acquires. When 
we focus on differences between acquirer and target nations, we find that government acquirers 
are more likely to invest in cross-border deals when cultures are less similar and in which political 
relations are relatively more positive. The economic magnitude of the results suggests that 
political relations are of first-order importance followed by institutional quality and finally 
culture.  
 Next we focus on the size of stake sought in cross-border deals. While the size of the stake 
sought is negatively related to cross-border deals of all types, we find that government firms 
acquire smaller stakes in cross-border deals relative to private firms. Specifically, the median 
stake sought for government firms in cross-border deals is 50% compared to a median stake 
sought of 100% for all other acquirers.  
 Finally, we examine deal success rates based on ownership type. Government acquirer 
acquisitions are approximately 50% more likely to fail in cross-border deals than non-
government acquirers in similar deals. Thus, government acquirers differ with respect to 
opportunity set on several dimensions relative to private firms. “  
This paper is the first, to our knowledge, to make the distinction between the investment 
opportunity set of real assets versus portfolio securities.  We identify three distinct characteristics 
of real assets’ investment opportunity set. One, the size of the real investment opportunity set is 
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not the same for all investors. It is dependent on the identity of the acquirer country, target 
country, the acquirer country to target country pairing, and the ownership structure of the 
acquirer. Two, due to the lumpiness of real assets, restricting the percent of ownership could 
cause the acquirer’s real asset portfolio to not fall on the efficient frontier. Consistent with this 
possibility, we find that government acquirers seek smaller stakes by half. Three, the risk that the 
transaction may not go through is equivalent to reduction from a universe of certain ‘m’ assets as 
in portfolio securities to a ‘p’ probability of a ‘m’ real assets opportunity set, and (1-p) 
probability of a ’n’ real assets opportunity set, where ‘n’ < ‘m.’ Our evidence indicates that 
government acquirers are twice as likely to see a failed deal.     
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides theory and hypotheses. 
Section 3 provides a description of the data collection efforts as well as specifics about the 
sample. Section 4 outlines the empirical method outlined in the paper. Section 5 describes the 
results. Section 6 provides a robustness analysis to ensure that the results are not spuriously 
determined and Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
II. Theory and Hypotheses 
Cross-border mergers make up a substantial portion of all deals globally, but research has 
generally focused on domestic deals. Recent work has expanded the focus to cross-border deals in 
the context of publicly-traded and privately-held firms. While this literature improves our 
understanding of cross-border deal dynamics, it does not address the case of government acquirers. 
One specific form of government acquirers, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), has received some 
attention in the literature. However, SWFs comprise only a portion of government acquisitions and 
the literature has not addressed the opportunity set for SWFs. Thus, we include both SWF and non-
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SWF government acquisitions in the sample. The investment set faced by government acquirers 
in cross-border deals has not, to the best of our knowledge, been addressed by the literature. Both 
the cross-border M&A and SWF literature help determine our approach and expectations. 
One motivation for mergers is profit maximization. Deals will take place when the 
acquiring firm is able to create shareholder wealth through the acquisition. The source of value 
may include synergies realized by the combined entity. Combining two business entities cross-
border, however, presents frictions related to culture, trust and political relations for all investor 
types and the existence of such frictions has been shown to influence deal activity in the private 
sector (Ahearn et al., 2012 and Dinc and Erel, 2012). Having a government acquirer in the deal 
may further complicate matters. In fact, it is unclear what role, if any, such frictions play in the 
level of government acquirer cross-border deal activity. 
The first possibility is that government acquirers do not differ from non-government 
acquirers in the potential deal opportunities that are available to them. Thus, we may expect that 
the government acquirers face the same opportunity set as non-government acquirers and make 
their selection using the same factors. Karolyi and Liao (2010) find some differences between 
government acquirers and non-government acquirers in cross-border deals, but conclude that the 
differences are economically small. However, they focus on cross-border differences in their 
analysis and do not address the opportunity set from the perspective of target nation selection, 
industry selection, stake selection, or the failure rate of deals as we do in this study.2 
The second possibility is that government firms face limitations in cross-border deals 
relative to non-government acquirers. Limitations may exist due to factors identified by the 
                                                 
2 Specifically, Karolyi and Liao (2010) do not consider the absence of investment from foreign governments (i.e., investment into 
a target nation = 0). Our paper differs then in recognizing that in this case no observation (i.e., no foreign government deals in a 
target nation) is an observation. We further differ from them in that we examine directly failed deals. 
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literature including: general bias against and distrust of foreign investment, culture, political 
relations, crisis periods, industry characteristics, or institutional and government quality. 
Government ownership has been linked to relatively poor performance and generally different 
characteristics relative to non-government firms in the privatization literature (i.e., Megginson et 
al., 1994, Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997, 2001, D’Souza et al., 2005, Boubakri et al., 2008, and 
Chen et al., 2008) and SWF literature (i.e., Dewenter et al., 2010, Kotter and Lel, 2011, Knill et 
al. 2012a, 2012b, Johan et al., 2013, Bortolotti et al., 2009). General bias against foreign investors 
has been documented in the literature. Ahearn et al. (2012), for example, find that lack of trust 
inhibits cross-border mergers for non-government acquirers. Further, Dinc and Erel (2012), find 
evidence of “widespread economic nationalism” in which target nations greatly prefer local 
acquirers to foreign acquirers, which they link to lower cross-border merger activity.  
Culture has also been examined in the context of cross-border merger activity. Ahearn et 
al. (2012), find that cultural similarity is positively related to cross-border merger volume for non-
government firms. Conversely, Erel et al. (2012) do not find cultural factors to be significant. Thus, 
the role of culture in cross-border mergers is not clear. 
Bilateral political relations between acquirer and target nations has likewise been identified 
as relevant to cross-border merger activity. Gupta and Yu (2009) and Li and Vashchilko (2010) 
discuss how the relationship between governments (i.e., bilateral political relations) impacts 
foreign investment. The former study suggests that investors consider the relationship between 
their domestic government and the government of potential investments. The latter study related 
changing political relations between governments and perceived political risks suggesting its 
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importance while investing.3The possibility exists that target nation governments may even block 
deals. However, Knill et al. (2012a) find that SWFs prefer to invest in nations with which they 
have relatively weaker political relations.4 
Crisis periods have also been linked to cross-border merger activity. Alquist et al. (2013) 
document increased cross-border M&A during crisis periods. However, they do not find that crisis 
period deals differ from non-crisis periods and instead conclude they are “business as usual.” Li et 
al. (2011) find that foreign ownership in general reduces firm volatility which suggests a stabilizing 
role for cross-border investment. With respect to government acquirers, there are times when 
government firms provide a valuable source of capital; specifically, government investment may 
be valuable during times of crisis. Fernandes (2009), for example, finds that SWFs provide a 
stabilizing effect when they provide capital in instances where private firms will not. Faccio et al. 
(2006) suggest that governments bailout firms that are politically connected more frequently than 
those that are not politically connected. This study, however, only considers political connections 
in a domestic context. There are therefore times when a government firm can provide a valuable 
source of capital and in these times, targets may be relatively more welcoming than during non-
crisis periods.  
Penetration of government foreign M&A activity into different industries is likely relevant. 
Indeed, governments hold certain industries as sensitive, disallowing foreign investment. The 
defense industry, for example, is an industry where governments would likely carefully consider 
foreign investment. Foreign government investment is perhaps even more scrutinized in this area 
                                                 
3 There is also a growing literature studying the political aspect of SWF investment. Studies by Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), 
Bernstein et al. (2010) and Knill et al.(2012a) find evidence consistent with political motivations. Conversely, Balding, 2008 and 
Karolyi and Liao (2010) find no evidence of political motivations in SWF investments. 
4 We note that the Knill et al. (2012a) results are based on SWFs only, a sample which is roughly one third the size of the sample 
in this paper which includes both SWF and other government-affiliated acquirers. 
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than private (i.e., non-government) investment. Two anecdotes from SWF investment provide 
good examples of this: 1) the forced divestiture by the US government of a port authority 
subsidiary purchased by Dubai-based SWF, and 2) the forced reduction of Kuwaiti SWF stake in 
British Petroleum by the British government. These and other anecdotes suggest that governments 
may not be able to invest in certain industries based on their sensitivity. Therefore, we may see 
differences in the opportunity set for government and non-government acquirers in terms of 
industry. 
An important consideration in examining the opportunity set of government firms is when 
attempted deals are subject to failure. Based on the nature of government firms, target nations may 
feel nervous about acquisitions from these firms. Interestingly, this area has received little attention 
in the literature. Though there has been some examination of failed deals, it has solely involved 
domestic acquisitions. Savor and Lu (2009), for example, focus on the cause of failed deals in the 
U.S. market. Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005) compare failed deals to completed deals in the U.S. 
market and find that misvaluation is higher in successful deals. The failure rate of cross-border 
deals to domestic deals is relatively unexplored, however. To the best of our knowledge the role 
that government affiliation may play in the success or failure of a deal is unaddressed by the 
literature. Karolyi and Liao (2010) analyze samples based on the inclusion/exclusion of failed 
deals, but they do not examine failed deals alone.  
A large literature discusses the role of institutional and government quality in the choice of 
target nation when investing abroad. From a practical perspective, the amount of liberalization a 
nation has is directly proportional to the opportunity set acquirers face (see, e.g., Bekaert et al., 
2005). The amount of protection in the form of legal recourse investors receive is positively linked 
to the quality of investment opportunity; factors such as the enforcement of securities regulation, 
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disclosure, etc. also positively influence potential deal quality (see, e.g., Kelley and Woidtke, 2006, 
Berkowitz et al., 2003; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998). Finally, acquirers might invest in foreign 
nations to gain favorable tax treatments. Grubert (2003), for example, discusses company 
strategies to avoid taxes through cross-border investment by non-government investors and 
country responses to them. Since governments do not have to pay taxes, this would be an obvious 
difference in investment motivations. There is evidence both supporting and contradicting the role 
of target nation institutional quality in cross-border deals. Erel et al. (2012) find that institutional 
quality is an important positive determinant of cross-border M&A activity. Chari and Chang 
(2009) examine the percent stake acquired in cross-border deals and find that stake is positively 
related to institutional quality and legal protection. However, Weitzel and Berns (2006) do not find 
target nation government quality (i.e., legal protection and rule of law) influence cross-border 
merger activity. Rossi and Volpin (2004) document an inverse relation between target nation legal 
protection and cross-border merger activity. Overall, the exact role of target nation institutional 
quality is not clear for non-government acquirers. 
  We note that many of the factors above have been addressed only in a non-government 
acquirer setting. As such, the analysis in this paper can extend our understanding of these factors 
in the context of government acquirers. It is possible that the concerns and objections to foreign 
companies could multiply if the acquirer is a foreign government company. This could be due to 
the target nation suspicions of these companies and a general aversion to the notion that foreign 
governments could exercise control extraterritorially over their economy. This resistance could 
further reduce the investment opportunity set available to foreign government acquirers. This may 
be reflected in quantitative terms (i.e., number of deals, number of target nations, stake acquired), 
quality terms (i.e., lower legal quality target nations) or the likelihood of success (i.e., whether or 
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not it fails). Thus, the focus of this paper is to examine if foreign government acquirers face a 
limited opportunity set relative to non-government acquirers. Formally stated, this becomes: 
 
Hypothesis (Null): There is no difference in the opportunity set for foreign government acquirers 
relative to non-government acquirers. 
Hypothesis (Alternative): Foreign government acquirers have a smaller opportunity set in terms of 
the number of target nations, industries, % stake acquired, quality of deal, and deal success.  
 
III. Data 
We collect all mergers and acquisitions from SDC Platinum for the sample term 1985 – 
2012. Ideally, we would follow the related literature closely on our sample construction, but deal 
screening techniques are not consistently applied in the merger literature. The identification of 
deals is particularly relevant given the findings of Netter et al. (2011) who find that screening 
techniques greatly influence results in certain M&A contexts. They specifically note that dropping 
deals without a reported deal value greatly reduces the sample size and leads to oversampling of 
relatively larger deals. Still, dropping such deals is common. Ahearn et al. (2012), for example, 
examine cross-border deals and drop all deals valued at less than $1 million or where the stake is 
less than 50%, all deals that have not been completed, and deals in which the location of the target 
or acquirer is unknown or is listed as multinational. They include both public and private targets. 
The focus of Ahearn et al. (2012) is on announcement returns, which is considerably different than 
the focus of this paper and we consequently do not follow their screening approach closely. 
Specifically, it is not necessary for us to link merger announcements to publicly traded acquirers 
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for event study purposes. Similar to our approach, Karolyi and Liao (2010) focus on government 
acquirers in cross-border deals and exclude countries that have received fewer than 50 cross-border 
deals. They provide results for deals with and without deal values disclosed. Additionally, they 
include results for a sample that includes failed results, although they do not address the success 
or failure rate of certain types of deals. We initially include failed deals in our analysis but 
eventually focus explicitly on those failed deals to give us a more nuanced analysis. 
We generally attempt to follow the literature in our sample selection, while making some 
adjustments based on the focus of our paper. Specifically, we have a large and inclusive sample, 
which is consistent with our focus on the opportunity set for government acquirers. The 
opportunity set includes issues such as stake sought, success and failure of the deal, and the general 
presence of any government deal activity. As such, our sample includes both public and private 
targets, deals with and without deal value disclosed (we present results for the deal value disclosed 
sample as well), completed and failed deals, and deals with less than 50% of the target acquired. 
We drop deals in which the target or acquirer nation is not identified or is listed as multinational 
and those deals involving a target nation that has fewer than 50 deals over the sample period.5 
We define government acquirers as any acquirer whose ultimate parent is classified as 
government by SDC Platinum. This is consistent with Karolyi and Liao (2010), who note that this 
definition includes government-owned firms and financial buyers (i.e., SWFs) in which 
government ownership exceeds 50%. The number of government acquirers using this definition 
totals 7,074 deals including both domestic and cross-border deals. The government sample is 
roughly 1% of the full sample of 701,816 deals. Of the 7,074 government deals, 1,529 are cross-
border. There are 115 target nations receiving at least one cross-border government investment 
                                                 
5This restriction results only in a loss of roughly 1,500 observations out of over 700,000 in the full sample. 
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(who have at least 50 deals total). If we apply a more restrictive filter to the deals and require that 
the deal value be disclosed, then there are 602 cross-border deals in which a government controlled 
firm is the acquirer. See Appendix A for detail in the observations that are lost at each step in the 
screening process and Table 1 for a detailed list of the deals by target nation.6 
[Insert Appendix A and Table 1 about here] 
In Table 2 we document the number of private and government cross-border deals for each 
target nation in the sample. We also calculate the proportion of government cross-border deals to 
private cross-border deals. The mean and median ratio is 1.61% and 1.16%, respectively. The 
nations with the highest ratio of government cross-border deals and a minimum of 10 such deals 
are: Estonia (3.04%), Bermuda (2.99%), Hong Kong (2.34%), and Thailand (1.79%). Twenty 
nations have received no government cross-border investment (but have received private cross-
border investment). China has the lowest ratio of government to private cross-border investment 
of target nations receiving at least 10 government cross-border investments at 0.33%. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 provides an industry breakdown of both government and private cross-border 
M&A activity based on the Fama and French 49 industry classifications for SIC codes. While 
every industry has received private cross-border M&A, one of the 49 industries has not received 
government cross-border investment in any target nation over the period examined using our most 
inclusive sample. Eighteen of the 49 industries have received fewer than 10 government cross-
                                                 
6 We do not address domestic governments as acquirers, which include: nationalization, forced sales, expropriation, bail-out, etc., 
since they are outside the scope of this paper. 
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border investments. The industries with the lowest ratio of government to private cross-border 
investment include: Shipping Containers, Recreation, Fabricated Products, Business Supplies, 
Candy and Soda, Healthcare and Printing and Publishing. The mean and median ratio of 
government to private cross-border deals for a given industry is 1.03% and 0.51%, respectively. 
The ratio of government to private cross-border deals is highest for Defense (10.32%)7, Computer 
Software (3.42%), Aircraft (3.16), Petroleum and Natural Gas (3.12%), and Transportation 
(3.05%). We note the importance of sample selection in this analysis. An example of this issue is 
that if we require deal values to be disclosed then we do not identify a single government cross-
border investment in defense. When we relax that constraint, we find that defense is proportionally 
the industry most likely to receive government cross-border investment. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
In Table 4 we present the global average (by number of deals) ratio of government cross-
border deals to all cross-border deals for each year in the sample. The mean and median ratio for 
a given year based on our inclusive sample is 1.07% and 0.96%, respectively. While Alquist et al. 
(2013) document higher cross-border activity for non-government acquirers during crisis-periods, 
we find no such change to government cross-border activity relative to non-government cross-
border deals during crisis periods in our sample. The 2007- 2010 period, for instance, sees higher 
than median government cross-border activity, but the highest years of activity are 1986 and 1993. 
In short, there is not an easily discernible pattern of government cross-border activity over time.  
                                                 
7 The target nations for government acquirer cross-border investment in defense firms includes: Belgium, Chile, France, Germany, 
Italy, Norway, Poland, Ukraine, and the United States. Four of the 16 deals involve investment by Ruag Holdings (Switzerland) in 
various German firms, three deals involve French weapons manufacturer Giat in Belgium and Germany, and the one US target firm 
was Aviall Inc. (Aviation) by Singapore.  
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[Insert Table 4 about here] 
IV. Empirical Methods 
We use deal-level probit regressions in order to identify determinants of government 
acquirers’ opportunity set for cross-border investments. Specifically, we categorize each deal as a 
government acquirer (i.e., G=1) or a non-government acquirer (i.e., G=0), which includes both 
publicly-traded firms and privately-held firms for acquirer n from nation j in target nation i. Given 
the limited dependent variable, we use probit analyses, but reported results are robust to the use of 
logit regressions.8Independent variables are created to capture deal characteristics, target nation 
economy size, and institutional characteristics of target nations that may be related to government 
acquirers’ opportunity set. These factors have been found to be significantly related to both non-
government deals (Savor and Lu, 2009, Ahearn et al., 2012, Erel, et al., 2012) and SWFs (Karolyi 
and Liao, 2010, Knill, et al. 2012a,b, Johan et al., 2013).Empirically, this becomes: 
(1) .arg ,,32,,1,, jiniijinjin YetGDPTDealG    
Where Dealn,i,j is a vector of deal characteristics. In addition to potential barriers to certain target 
nations or industries, the size of the stake may also be limited for government acquirers. Thus, the 
Deal vector includes % Stake Sought, Cash Only, Stock Only, Value of Transaction and Failed 
Deals. Percentage Stake is the percent of the target firm sought by the acquirer in a given deal, 
Cash Only and Stock Only are indicator variables which take on a value of one if the offer type is 
all cash or all stock, respectively. A negative coefficient on % Stake Sought would be consistent 
with greater barriers faced by government acquirers in cross-border deals or with government 
                                                 
8 Results not reported for brevity but are available upon request.  
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acquirers preferring lower stakes. Value of Transaction is the value of the deal in millions of US 
dollars. While % Stake Sought captures factors such as control and voting rights, the absolute size 
of the deal provides indirect information about the size of the target. Specifically, larger deal values 
will proxy for larger firms. Additionally, we include Failed Deals which is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. This definition of failed deals is 
consistent with both Savor and Lu (2009) and Karolyi and Liao (2010). The relative success rate 
of government cross-border deals is a potential area of difference compared to other deal types. A 
positive and significant coefficient would indicate that government acquirers face more difficulty 
completing cross-border deals than private acquirers.  
GDP Target, is the gross domestic product per capita of the target nation and is included to 
capture the relative size of the target nation economy. Non-government cross-border deals are 
more common in countries with relatively larger GDPs (i.e., note in Table 2 that roughly 23% of 
all non-government cross-border deals are in the U.S. or U.K.). A significant coefficient would 
indicate that government acquirers differ from non-government acquirers in this dimension. 
Yi is a vector of target nation institutional characteristics that might influence the number 
of deals in a country. The openness of the target nation to foreign investors is likely related to the 
ability of government acquirers to complete deals in a given target nation. Thus, we include 
Liberalization Target, which is the liberalization intensity measure for the target nation taken from 
Bekaert et al. (2005). Non-government acquirers have been found to prefer target nations with 
relatively better developed legal systems in cross-border deals. We include Legality Target and 
Rule of Law Target, which is the legality index and measure of law and order, respectively, both 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to one if the target 
nation is classified as an offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. This variable is 
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included given its significance in regressions from Karolyi and Liao (2010) in tests of determinants 
of cross-border acquisitions for government and non-government acquirers. PR is the bilateral 
political relations between the acquirer and target nation. This variable is constructed as in Gartzke 
(1998) and Knill at al. (2012a) and is based on how closely related UN General Assembly votes 
are for a given acquirer and target nation pair. The variable ranges from -1 to +1 where -1 
corresponds to all votes being different and +1 corresponds to all votes being the same for a given 
year. Robust standard errors that are clustered by target nation are used in addition to year indicator 
variables. This is consistent with the suggestion of Petersen (2009) for panel data as well as the 
cross-border M&A literature (i.e., Ahearn et al., 2012 and Erel et al., 2012). 
In addition to the probit regression discussed above, we perform bivariate probit analyses. 
The two dependent variables in the bivariate probit are indicators for cross-border deals and 
government cross-border deals, respectively. This approach is similar in spirit to seemingly 
unrelated regressions in that there are separate models with correlated errors. As in the probit 
regressions discussed above, robust standard errors that are clustered by target nation are used in 
addition to year indicator variables. All variable definitions and sources can be found in Appendix 
B. 
Table 5 provides information about the data characteristics. Panel A provides the summary 
statistics for the sample used in the regression and Panel B provides the correlations. Government 
Cross-Border is the dependent variable in our probit regressions. It is an indicator variable that 
takes on a value of one if the deal involves a foreign government acquirer and is zero otherwise. 
The mean of 0.002 indicates that out of all deals globally, 0.20% of those are cross-border deals 
involving government acquirers.  
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Panel B provides pairwise correlations for the variables used in our analysis and reveals 
that Government Cross-Border is negatively related to % Stake Sought, Stock Only, GDP Target, 
Liberalization Target, Legality Target, Tax Haven Target, and Rule of Law Target. Alluding to a 
limited opportunity set and foreshadowing results to come, Government Cross-Border is positively 
correlated with Failed Deal. The institutional characteristics used are generally strongly positively 
correlated. For instance, the correlation between Rule of Law Target and GDP Target, 
Liberalization Target, and Legality Target is greater than 50%. Because of this, we only include 
one of the institutional characteristics in a given model.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
V. Results 
In Table 6 we present the mean and median for each of our variables for both government 
cross-border deals and all other deals. We provide a t-test of the difference in means as well as a 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum test to determine if the samples are the same. For all variables, we find that 
the government cross-border sample differs from all other deals (significant at the 1% level). 
Government cross-border deals have lower stakes acquired, are more likely to fail, take place in 
smaller target nations and target nations that are less liberalized, have lower legal protection, are 
not tax havens and have lower rule of law. Government cross-border deals are more likely to be 
cash only and are more likely to be larger deals. Overall, the results are consistent with a limited 
opportunity set for government acquirers in both quantity and quality. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
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 Table 7 reports the number of government cross-border deals based on various 
characteristics. We divide all cross-border deals into four groups based first on institutional 
characteristics and secondly on either culture or political relations. This raw count of deals based 
on certain key characteristics allows us to establish the opportunity set faced by government 
acquirers. The first group includes deals with above-median institutional characteristics (above-
median liberalization and legality index) and in which the culture between the acquirer and target 
nation is similar (i.e., language and religion are the same) or in which the political relations 
between the acquirer and target nation are above median. There are 187 deals involving 
government acquirers in this group (compared to 17,343 private firm deals in this group). The 
second group involves above-median institutional characteristics and dissimilar cultures. This 
group sees 99 government deals (compared to 10,609 private deals). The third group involves 
below median institutional characteristics and similar cultures and contains 268 government deals 
(compared to 17,990 private deals). The fourth group involves deals with below median 
institutional characteristics and dissimilar cultures. This group sees 275 deals (compared to 42,830 
private deals). Collectively, the results in this table are consistent with government deals being 
more likely in target nations with relatively weak institutional characteristics (66% of all 
government cross-border deals in this category) and slightly more likely in pairs with similar 
cultures (55% of all government cross-border deals in this category). The results suggest that weak 
institutional characteristics are relatively more important than culture in characterizing the 
opportunity set faced by government acquirers.   
 In the bottom rows of Table 7 we provide results in which deals are grouped as before 
except political relations is used in place of culture. The results in this analysis suggest clear 
evidence of the role of political relations in determining government acquirer opportunity sets. 
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Specifically, regardless of institutional quality, nearly all government cross-border deals are in 
target nations with which the acquirer nation has relatively more positive political relations, with 
approximately 95% of the deals falling in the above median political relations group.9 The results 
suggest that political relations are of first order importance in determining the opportunity set faced 
by government acquirers. 
Table 8 reports the results of our deal-level probit analysis. The dependent variable in these 
regressions is an indicator equal to one if the deal involves a government acquirer in a cross-border 
deal and zero otherwise. The independent variables are designed to capture potential sources of 
difference between government acquirers in cross-border deals and all other deal types with respect 
to opportunity set. We find that % Stake Sought is negatively and significantly related to the 
likelihood of a deal being government acquirer related and cross-border in all specifications in 
which it is included at the 1% level. Thus, in addition to the limited opportunity set of target 
nations, government acquirers seem to face limitations in the size of stake in cross-border deals 
relative to all other deal types. An alternative interpretation is that government acquirers may 
prefer a smaller stake relative to non-government acquirers to avoid attention or controversy. In 
economic terms, the median stake sought for government firms in cross-border deals is 50% 
compared to a median of 100% for all other deal types.  
 Stock Only is negatively related (at the 1% level) to government cross-border acquisitions. 
This is perhaps not surprising given that many government acquirers do not have publicly-traded 
shares limiting the possible offer type to cash. Even for publicly-traded government firms, access 
to cash for acquisition purposes from state-owned banks may be relatively easy to obtain.  
                                                 
9 Note that the median political relations is determined based on all cross-border deals which includes both private 
and government acquirers.  
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 Value of Transaction is positively related (at the 1% level) to government cross-border 
acquisitions. Specifically, the marginal effect is approximately $1 million. This is consistent with 
government acquirers seeking relatively larger targets in cross-border deals, albeit only modestly 
larger. The inclusion of this variable drops the sample size from 644,965 observations in 
specification (1) to 287,653 observations in specification (2). Due to the limiting nature of this 
variable, we estimate all other specifications in Table 7 without deal value. We provide additional 
robustness checks including deal value in Appendix C. 
 Failed Deal is positively related (at the 1% level) to government cross-border acquisitions. 
This is consistent with a higher failure rate for government acquirers in cross-border deals. Results 
from Table 6 on the failure rate of various deal types suggests that government cross-border deals 
fail roughly 38% of the time relative to private deals (cross-border and domestic) failure rate of 
23%. Thus, economically, government cross-border deals are much riskier with respect to potential 
for failure. This is consistent with a limited “investible” opportunity set for government acquirers 
in cross-border deals.  
 GDP Target appears to be only marginally significant in our analysis, as evidenced by the 
fact that it is statistically insignificant in three of four specifications. Overall, the size of the target 
nation does not appear to drive government cross-border acquisitions when considering other deal 
and target nation characteristics.  
 Variables related to target nation institutions including Liberalization Target, Legality 
Target, Rule of Law Target, and Tax Haven Target are all negatively related to government cross-
border acquisitions (statistically significant in five of six specifications). This is consistent with 
government acquirers having to settle for less desirable target nations with lower quality legal 
systems and lower levels of openness.   
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[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 Table 9 presents the results of our bivariate probit analyses, which are similar in spirit to 
seemingly unrelated regression models. The two dependent variables in this model are an indicator 
for all cross-border deals and an indicator for all cross-border deals involving government 
acquirers, respectively. We then compare the coefficients for each group to determine if 
government cross-border deals differ from other cross-border deals across key dimensions 
(significant differences at a minimum of the 5% level are denoted by bold coefficients in Table 9). 
The deal benchmark in Table 8is all deals, while the approach in Table 9 uses a benchmark of 
cross-border deals. This allows us to isolate the role of government affiliation in cross-border deals 
while still including all deals in the sample. 
 Our results suggest that government deals involve smaller stakes, are less likely to be stock 
only and are larger than cross-border deals in general. Government cross-border deals are more 
likely to fail, even relative to other cross-border deals. In unreported results, we find that the failure 
rate for all cross-border deals is 24% compared to government cross-border failure rates of 38%. 
Once we account for potential endogeneity in the analysis, results on deal quality tell a slightly 
different story than in Table 8. Specifically, government acquirers invest in larger target nations 
with better legal quality (Legality Target and Rule of Law Target) when compared to all cross-
border deals. Additionally, government acquirers are less likely to seek tax haven nations in their 
M&A. The remaining variables are generally not significantly different between the two groups 
suggesting that these factors are similarly related to government and non-government acquirers in 
cross-border deals. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
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 While Table 9 helps to isolate the role of government in cross-border deals, the sample still 
includes all deals (i.e., domestic and cross-border). Due to the inclusion of all deals in the sample, 
it is not appropriate to consider target and acquirer nation differences given that much of the sample 
(i.e., domestic) sees no differences in these variables. In Table 10 we focus on cross-border deals 
and now include differences in target and acquirer nation characteristics in our probit regressions. 
In addition to the institutional characteristics examined previously, we now add cultural and 
political proxies to our analysis. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the deal is 
cross-border and involves a government acquirer and is zero otherwise. 
 We find that differences in tax haven status, language, religion, and culture are positively 
related to the probability of a cross-border deal involving a government acquirer. While the 
research is mixed on whether or not non-government acquirers on average seek target nations with 
similar characteristics, our evidence suggests that government acquirers have to settle for target 
nations with characteristics dissimilar to theirs. One notable exception to this trend is that political 
relations are positively related to government cross-border deals. This result is consistent with 
Gupta and Yu (2009) and Li and Vashchilko (2010) who find that relatively more positive political 
relations are linked to more foreign investment in general. This result is inconsistent with Knill et 
al. (2012a) who find that one specific form of government investor, SWFs, prefer to invest in 
nations with which they have relatively weaker political relations. This difference is easily 
reconciled, however, once it is noted that Knill et al. (2012a) uses only SWFs in its sample.10 
Combining the results of Tables 8 and 10, we find that government acquirers are more likely to 
invest in target nations with different and lower quality institutional characteristics. This is 
                                                 
10 SWFs represent only one third of the sample in this paper. 
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consistent with government firms settling for less desirable targets as a result of reduced 
opportunity set. Further, they are more likely to invest in target nations with dissimilar cultures.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Table 11 reports the results of deal-level probit analyses similar to Table 8 except for the 
dependent variable and variable of interest. The dependent variable in Table 11 is an indicator 
equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. The independent variables are 
designed to capture potential sources of failed deals. Particularly, our variable of interest is 
Government Cross-border, which is an indicator equal to one if a deal involves a government 
acquirer in a cross-border deal and zero otherwise. This allows us to determine if government 
acquirers experience a more limited opportunity set in the form of a higher failure rate of deals.  
We find that Government Cross-border is positively related to failed deals (significant at 
1% in all but one specification where it is 5%). The economic magnitude of this result indicates 
that government acquirers in cross-border deals are on average roughly twice as likely (12.5% in 
absolute terms) to experience a failed deal than all other deal types even after controlling for deal 
and target nation characteristics. Given that the unconditional failure rate from Table 5 is 21.3%, 
this indicates that government acquirers face a greatly constrained set of opportunities when 
considering failure rates. We again note that the failure rate for non-government cross-border deals 
is less than 1% higher than non-government domestic deals, which suggests that the observed 
result is not due to the cross-border nature of the deal but rather the involvement of a government 
acquirer.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
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VI. Robustness 
 We have executed a battery of robustness tests. We report numerous alternate 
specifications in Appendices C and D and other checks have been completed but not reported for 
brevity.11Appendix C reports the robustness results of deal-level probit regressions similar to Table 
8. The value of the transaction is included in specifications (1) through (4), which greatly reduces 
the sample (over 300,000 observations lost) but has the advantage of controlling for deal size. 
Specifications (4) through (8) include acquirer nation indicators in addition to year indicators and 
clustering by target nation. The additional indicators allow us to examine if certain acquirer nations 
drive the results. The results in Appendix C confirm our conclusions in Table 8. Specifically, the 
stake sought, liberalization, legal protection, tax haven status and rule of law (deal size, failed 
deals) are negatively (positively) related to government cross-border deals. 
 Appendix D reports the robustness results of deal-level probit regressions similar to Table 
11. The dependent variable in specifications (1) through (8) is an indicator equal to one if the deal 
is not completed and zero otherwise as in Table 11. The dependent variable in specifications (9) 
through (12) is an indicator equal to one if the deal is withdrawn and zero otherwise. This is a more 
strict definition of a failed deal as it requires that the deal was specifically reported as withdrawn. 
Using the failed deal definition from Table 11 there are over 160,000 failed deals whereas using 
the withdrawn definition there are just over 21,000 withdrawn deals. While it is more conventional 
to use the definition in Table 11, we nonetheless provide results using the more restrictive 
definition in Appendix D. The value of the transaction included in specifications (1) through (4) 
                                                 
11 Our results are qualitatively identical when using: 1) logit instead of probit, 2) alternate dependent variable which 
is the ratio of government cross-border deals to all deals in a fractional tobit framework, 3) additional control variables 
including WTO membership, FDI Restrictiveness, anti-self-dealing index and accounting disclosure index. 
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greatly reduces the sample (over 300,000 observations lost) but has the advantage of controlling 
for deal size. Specifications (4) through (8) include acquirer nation indicators in addition to year 
indicators and clustering by target nation. The additional indicators allow us to examine if certain 
acquirer nations drive the results. In Appendix D we find results that are consistent with Table 11. 
Specifically, Government Cross-border is positively (and statistically significantly) related to 
failed deals regardless of the definition of failed deals, inclusion of deal value, or acquirer nation 
indicators.  
 
VII. Conclusions 
The role of investment opportunity set in real assets is not as well developed in the literature 
as that of the investment opportunity set in portfolio investment. With respect to one form of 
investment opportunity, cross-border mergers and acquisitions, we identify four issues with 
testable implications. First, we examine if the size of the investment opportunity set depends on 
target country characteristics. Our results indicate that foreign acquirers are less likely to invest in 
target nations that have relatively lower GDP, that are less open and that have less developed legal 
protection. Second, we identify the role that the ownership type or affiliation of the foreign firm 
has in the opportunity set. We find that government owned acquirers invest in fewer target nations 
and industries relative to private firms. Government firms are also more likely to invest in target 
nations with which they have dissimilar cultures and relatively more positive political relations. 
These are consequences of their more restricted opportunity set as they would have likely preferred 
to invest in countries with similar cultures to ease post-merger integration and not be limited to 
friendly countries. Third, the real asset investment opportunity set could be reduced if the foreign 
firm faces constraints on the percentage of ownership. We find that foreign firms in general take a 
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smaller stake than domestic firms. Foreign government firms take an even smaller stake – one that 
is one half the size of all other acquirer types in a typical deal. Fourth, higher foreign deal failure 
rates would be consistent with a reduction in the real asset opportunity set. We find that the failure 
rate for foreign government acquirers is double that of foreign private firms. 
Overall, our results indicate a reduced opportunity set for foreign acquirers – a result that is 
greatly magnified for foreign government owned firms. Our results are of particular interest given 
that the ideological debate in political economics worldwide has shifted from the planned economy 
of socialism/communism versus capitalism in much of the 20th century to the mixed state and 
private ownership versus private ownership economies in the current period. Of these large state-
owned companies, many have international stock listings as a result of consolidation and partial 
privatization. These are hailed by some supporters as an improved compromise of socialism and 
capitalism, e.g., witness magazine cover, “The rise of state capitalism” (Economist, 2012), and 
books with titles such as, “The End of the Free Market” (Bremmer, 2010). While supporters point 
to their size and prevalence around the world (in emerging markets alone, they account for a third 
of the economy and nearly $10 trillion in stock market capitalization), detractors can point out that 
these companies are often inefficient, and waste government connected financing by making poor 
investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). However, gauging the success of these government 
companies with conventional accounting and stock returns measures is particularly treacherous 
since their shareholders could gain from the sundries of government largess, easy access to low 
cost financing to outright subsidy, and an implicit guarantee against failure at the expense of the 
rest of the economy.  
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Appendix A 
Deal Screening 
Deal Screening Number of Deals Remaining 
1. Initial collection of data: 1985-2012 815,190  
2. Drop deals without party identification 701,816 
3. Drop deals <$1 million or missing deal values 289,851 
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Appendix B 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Variable Definition Source 
Government 
Cross-Border 
An indicator variable equal to one if the target is in a different nation than the acquirer and 
the acquirer is government and zero otherwise. Government acquirers are those firms 
identified in SDC with acquirer public status of “Government.”  
SDC Platinum 
Cross-Border  An indicator variable equal to one if the target is in a different nation than the acquirer.  SDC Platinum 
% Stake Sought The percent stake sought by the acquirer. SDC Platinum 
Cash Only An indicator variable equal to one if the deal terms include cash offer only and zero 
otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Stock Only An indicator variable equal to one if the deal terms include stock offer only and zero 
otherwise. 
SDC Platinum 
Value of 
Transaction 
The value of the transaction in billions of dollars. SDC Platinum 
Failed Deal An indicator variable equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. SDC Platinum 
GDP Target The GDP per capita of the target nation. World Bank 
Liberalization 
Target 
The liberalization intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Bekaert et al. (2005). 
Legality Target The weighted average of following factors: efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, shareholder rights constitutes 
a nation’s legality score. This variable is the target nation legality. 
Berkowitz et al.(2003); La 
Porta et al.(1997), (1998) 
Tax Haven 
Target 
An indicator variable equal to one if the target nation is an “offshore financial center” 
(OFC).  
IMF, Karolyi and 
Liao(2010) 
Rule of Law 
Target 
A measure of the law and order tradition in the target nation based on assessment by the 
risk-rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). This variable ranges between zero and 
ten. 
La Porta et al.(1998) 
Liberalization 
Difference 
The absolute value of the difference in liberalization intensity measure for the target and 
acquirer nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). 
Bekaert et al. (2005). 
Legality 
Difference 
The weighted average of following factors: efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, 
corruption, risk of expropriation, risk of contract repudiation, shareholder rights constitutes 
a nation’s legality score. This variable is the absolute value of the difference between target 
and acquirer nation legality. 
Berkowitz et al.(2003); La 
Porta et al.(1997), (1998) 
Tax Haven 
Difference 
An indicator variable equal to one if the target nation is an “offshore financial center” 
(OFC). This variable is the absolute value of the difference between target and acquirer 
nation tax haven status. 
IMF, Karolyi and 
Liao(2010) 
Rule of Law 
Difference 
A measure of the law and order tradition in the target nation based on assessment by the 
risk-rating agency International Country Risk (ICR). This variable ranges between zero and 
ten. This variable is the absolute value of the difference between target and acquirer nation 
rule of law. 
La Porta et al.(1998) 
Language 
Difference 
An index from zero (same) to one (different) describing whether or not the acquirer and 
target nations have different languages. 
CIA World Factbook 
Religion 
Difference 
An indicator variable equal to one if the target and acquirer nation have the same major 
religion and zero otherwise.  
CIA World Factbook 
Culture Index An indicator variable equal to one if the target nation and acquirer nation have difference 
major language and different major religions and zero otherwise. 
CIA World Factbook 
Geographic 
Distance 
A dummy variable that indicates whether countries are geographically distant from the 
acquiring nation. We define “distant” as within 500 miles of each other. 
Gleditsch and Ward 
(2001) 
PR The political relations between the acquirer and target nation measured by the distance 
between UN voting records for a given bilateral pair. 
Gartzke (1998) 
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Appendix C 
Government Opportunity Set: Deal-Level Probit 
This table presents the results of the following probit regression: .arg ,,32,,1,, jiniijinjin YetGDPTDealG   The 
dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if a deal involves a government acquirer (i.e., G=1) in a cross-border deal or a zero 
otherwise for acquirer n from nation j in target nation i. Deal is a vector of deal characteristics. % Stake Sought, is the percent of 
the target firm sought by the acquirer in a given deal. Cash Only and Stock Only are indicator variables that take the value of one 
if the offer type of the deal is all cash or all stock, respectively. Value of Transaction is the U.S. dollar value of the deal in billions. 
Failed Deal is an indicator equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. GDP Target is the gross domestic product 
per capita of the target nation. Y is a vector of target nation institutional characteristics. Liberalization Target is the liberalization 
intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Legality Target and Rule of Law Target are the legality index 
and measure of law and order, respectively, both from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the target nation is classified as an offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported 
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by target nation and all specification include year indicators. Specifications (5) through 
(8) include acquirer nation indicators. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample 
includes all M&A deals (i.e., acquirer n from nation j into target nation “i”) from SDC Platinum from 1985-2012. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
% Stake Sought -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Only 0.162*** 0.163*** 0.184*** 0.164*** 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Stock Only -0.034 -0.053 -0.052 -0.049 -0.144 -0.153 -0.153 -0.153 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.109) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Value of Transaction 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***     
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
Failed Deal 0.054* 0.062** 0.042 0.061** 0.081** 0.078** 0.078** 0.078** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
GDP Target -0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Liberalization Target 0.004    -0.396**    
 (0.048)    (0.160)    
Legality Target  -0.011*    -0.043**   
  (0.006)    (0.018)   
Tax Haven Target   -0.079***    -0.001***  
   (0.030)    (0.000)  
Rule of Law Target    -0.011    -0.062** 
    (0.011)    (0.026) 
Observations 217,271 225,749 250,185 226,533 519,333 535,348 535,348 535,348 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0796 0.0795 0.0743 0.0798 0.0776 0.0803 0.0803 0.0803 
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Appendix D 
Government Opportunity Set: Failed Deal Probit 
This table presents the results of the following probit regression: .arg ,,32,,1,, jiniijinjin YetGDPTDealF   The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the deal 
is not completed and zero otherwise for acquirer n from nation j in target nation i in specifications (1) through (8). In specifications (9) through (12) the dependent variable is an 
indicator equal to one if the deal is withdrawn and zero otherwise. Deal is a vector of deal characteristics. Government CB is an indicator equal to one if a deal involves a government 
acquirer in a cross-border deal or a zero otherwise. % Stake Sought, which is the percent of the target firm sought by the acquirer in a given deal. Cash Only and Stock Only are 
indicator variables which take the value of one if the offer type of the deal is all cash or all stock, respectively. Value of Transaction is the U.S. dollar value of the deal in billions. 
Failed Deal is an indicator equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. GDP Target is the gross domestic product per capita of the target nation. Y is a vector of 
target nation institutional characteristics. Liberalization Target is the liberalization intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Legality Target and Rule of Law 
Target are the legality index and measure of law and order, respectively, both from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to one if the target nation 
is classified as an offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by target nation and all 
specification include year indicators. Specifications (5) through (8) include acquirer nation indicators. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
The sample includes all M&A deals (i.e., acquirer n from nation j into target nation “i”) from SDC Platinum from 1985-2012. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Government CB 0.093* 0.099** 0.065* 0.098** 0.088*** 0.073*** 0.055*** 0.072*** 0.033** 0.034** 0.031** 0.035** 
 (0.049) (0.042) (0.039) (0.042) (0.024) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015) 
% Stake Sought -0.028** -0.048*** -0.041*** -0.046*** 0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.002 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.013) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Cash Only -4.110*** -4.250*** -4.408*** -4.262*** -3.475*** -3.433*** -3.185*** -3.395*** 0.975*** 1.017*** 0.937*** 1.020*** 
 (1.386) (1.333) (1.226) (1.343) (0.510) (0.494) (0.488) (0.490) (0.219) (0.217) (0.196) (0.198) 
Stock Only 3.444* 3.084* 3.836** 3.116* 5.104*** 5.213*** 5.400*** 5.256*** 3.714*** 3.748*** 3.607*** 3.651*** 
 (1.846) (1.748) (1.713) (1.640) (1.212) (1.220) (1.162) (1.212) (0.417) (0.352) (0.504) (0.331) 
Value of Transaction -0.007 -0.012 -0.017 -0.012         
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013)         
GDP Target -0.098 -0.298* -0.377*** -0.255* -0.027 -0.040 -0.191*** -0.042 0.003 -0.043 -0.029* -0.070*** 
 (0.087) (0.167) (0.121) (0.144) (0.059) (0.083) (0.060) (0.076) (0.021) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021) 
Liberalization Target -9.274***    
-
10.422***    -1.578**    
 (3.367)    (2.338)    (0.763)    
Legality Target  0.177    -0.786**    0.113   
  (0.673)    (0.330)    (0.117)   
Tax Haven Target   -2.100    -0.910    0.600  
   (2.742)    (0.991)    (0.580)  
Rule of Law Target    -0.082    -1.303***    0.407** 
    (0.939)    (0.499)    (0.163) 
Observations 217,271 225,749 250,185 226,533 522,487 535,627 589,373 537,102 522,521 535,661 589,384 537,136 
Chi-Square 0.0348 0.0335 0.0651 0.0334 0.0364 0.0385 0.0601 0.0385 0.0463 0.0436 0.0430 0.0445 
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Table 1 
All Acquisitions by Target Nation 
This table presents the number of acquisitions (Deals) by target nation for all deal types (i.e., private firm, government, domestic, 
cross-border).Percent is the percent of all deals represented by the target nation. The “Total” sample includes all M&A deals and 
the “Value Disclosed” sample includes only those deals with deal value disclosed in SDC Platinum from 1985-2012.  
Target Nation 
Total No. of 
Deals 
No. of Deals 
Value 
Disclosed     Target Nation 
Total No. of 
Deals 
No. of Deals 
Value 
Disclosed 
Albania 51 26   El Salvador 79 36 
Algeria 58 22   Estonia 775 170 
Angola 53 12   Fiji 43 27 
Argentina 3,126 1,407   Finland 7,173 1,551 
Armenia 78 29   France 27,871 7,351 
Australia 25,966 14,357   Gabon 48 15 
Austria 3,831 646   Georgia 86 33 
Azerbaijan 74 17   Germany 33,489 5,252 
Bahamas 129 69   Ghana 108 45 
Bahrain 145 52   Greece 1,963 665 
Bangladesh 56 28   Guatemala 90 41 
Barbados 72 35   Guernsey 143 90 
Belarus 119 21   Guyana 55 33 
Belgium 5,048 1,267   Honduras 45 13 
Bermuda 501 328   Hong Kong 11,103 7,812 
Bolivia 210 87   Hungary 2,475 542 
Bosnia 101 35   Iceland 279 97 
Botswana 44 21   India 11,574 4,367 
Brazil 7,676 3,345   Indonesia 3,622 1,708 
British Virgin 488 254   Iraq 47 21 
Bulgaria 1,156 417   Ireland-Rep 2,892 1,268 
Cambodia 73 36   Isle of Man 104 63 
Canada 33,844 16,725   Israel 2,363 1,338 
Cayman Islands 211 102   Italy 14,348 5,004 
Chile 2,140 1,085   Ivory Coast 96 35 
China 27,531 18,999   Jamaica 106 42 
Colombia 1,257 530   Japan 27,745 12,611 
Costa Rica 184 65   Jersey 123 68 
Croatia 623 244   Jordan 487 98 
Cyprus 605 222   Kazakhstan 450 190 
Czech Republic 2,825 601   Kenya 151 47 
Czechoslovakia 148 38   Kuwait 289 166 
Denmark 5,513 1,260   Kyrgyzstan 73 41 
Dominican Rep 108 45   Latvia 536 99 
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Ecuador 242 96   Lebanon 130 38 
Egypt 912 399   Lithuania 756 205 
Luxembourg 728 262   Singapore 5,948 3,564 
Macau 106 63   Slovak Rep 626 164 
Macedonia 114 33   Slovenia 479 125 
Malaysia 11,695 5,470   South Africa 5,574 2,921 
Malta 83 41   South Korea 8,464 6,211 
Mauritius 133 49   Spain 14,710 4,814 
Mexico 3,288 1,482   Sri Lanka 417 184 
Moldova 66 23   Sweden 11,859 3,566 
Monaco 73 33   Switzerland 7,322 1,261 
Mongolia 124 69   Taiwan 2,685 1,515 
Morocco 317 151   Tanzania 116 44 
Mozambique 83 41   Thailand 3,823 2,115 
Namibia 87 41   Trinidad&Tob 93 40 
Neth Antilles 79 28   Turkey 2,183 978 
Netherlands 11,487 2,476   Uganda 65 17 
New Zealand 4,643 1,876   Ukraine 2,158 317 
Nicaragua 67 31   United Kingdom 62,566 32,082 
Nigeria 340 110   United States 219,756 91,522 
Norway 6,926 2,471   Uruguay 217 71 
Oman 216 57   Utd Arab Em 733 208 
Pakistan 364 112   Uzbekistan 95 45 
Panama 274 132   Venezuela 674 260 
Papua N Guinea 220 124   Vietnam 1,619 584 
Paraguay 54 20   Yugoslavia 61 29 
Peru 1,316 642   Zambia 95 43 
Philippines 2,474 1,176   Zimbabwe 216 73 
Poland 4,691 1,783      
Portugal 2,674 1,035   Total 701,816 289,851 
Puerto Rico 371 153      
Qatar 131 39      
Rep of Congo 45 25      
Romania 1,177 418      
Russian Fed 16,999 2,195      
Saudi Arabia 383 115      
Serbia 231 101      
Serbia & Mont. 127 64           
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Table 2 
Private and Government Cross-Border Acquisitions by Target Nation 
This table presents the number of acquisitions (Deals) by target nation for cross-border deals. Private refers to acquirers that are 
not identified as government. Government refers to acquirers identified as government. G/P is the ratio of government cross-
border deals to private cross-border deals for a given target nation. The “Total” sample includes all M&A deals and the “Value 
Disclosed” sample includes only those deals with deal value disclosed in SDC Platinum from 1985-2012.  
Target Nation Total Private 
Private Value 
Disclosed 
Total 
Government 
Government 
Value 
Disclosed G/P Total 
G/P Value 
Disclosed 
Albania 50 25 1 1 2.00% 4.00% 
Algeria 57 21 1 1 1.75% 4.76% 
Angola 51 12 2 0 3.92% 0.00% 
Argentina 1,732 783 16 8 0.92% 1.02% 
Armenia 76 29 2 0 2.63% 0.00% 
Australia 6,274 3,561 85 64 1.35% 1.80% 
Austria 1,649 323 14 4 0.85% 1.24% 
Azerbaijan 70 16 4 1 5.71% 6.25% 
Bahamas 101 58 1 1 0.99% 1.72% 
Bahrain 73 32 5 0 6.85% 0.00% 
Bangladesh 53 25 3 3 5.66% 12.00% 
Barbados 60 32 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Belarus 115 21 4 0 3.48% 0.00% 
Belgium 2,570 741 16 6 0.62% 0.81% 
Bermuda 334 218 10 4 2.99% 1.83% 
Bolivia 136 69 2 0 1.47% 0.00% 
Bosnia 99 35 2 0 2.02% 0.00% 
Botswana 44 21 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Brazil 2,951 1,228 22 11 0.75% 0.90% 
British Virgin 440 221 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Bulgaria 599 218 2 2 0.33% 0.92% 
Cambodia 69 34 4 2 5.80% 5.88% 
Canada 8,452 3,809 40 19 0.47% 0.50% 
Cayman Islands 186 95 4 1 2.15% 1.05% 
Chile 1,079 541 11 4 1.02% 0.74% 
China 7,526 4,374 25 10 0.33% 0.23% 
Colombia 714 324 3 0 0.42% 0.00% 
Costa Rica 130 47 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Croatia 325 126 4 1 1.23% 0.79% 
Cyprus 339 111 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Czech Republic 1,503 353 13 6 0.86% 1.70% 
Czechoslovakia 146 38 2 0 1.37% 0.00% 
Denmark 2,096 617 24 12 1.15% 1.94% 
Dominican Rep 106 43 2 2 1.89% 4.65% 
Ecuador 163 73 1 1 0.61% 1.37% 
Egypt 369 166 6 1 1.63% 0.60% 
El Salvador 78 36 1 0 1.28% 0.00% 
Estonia 427 98 13 5 3.04% 5.10% 
Fiji 42 27 1 0 2.38% 0.00% 
Finland 1,908 541 10 1 0.52% 0.18% 
France 8,226 2,889 57 14 0.69% 0.48% 
Gabon 48 15 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
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Georgia 83 31 3 2 3.61% 6.45% 
Germany 11,306 3,008 93 13 0.82% 0.43% 
Ghana 106 44 2 1 1.89% 2.27% 
Greece 454 191 6 3 1.32% 1.57% 
Guatemala 86 38 4 3 4.65% 7.89% 
Guernsey 101 63 2 1 1.98% 1.59% 
Guyana 51 31 4 2 7.84% 6.45% 
Honduras 45 13 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Hong Kong 3,467 2,033 81 49 2.34% 2.41% 
Hungary 1,236 321 18 7 1.46% 2.18% 
Iceland 56 20 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
India 3,856 1,727 41 15 1.06% 0.87% 
Indonesia 1,737 855 28 11 1.61% 1.29% 
Iraq 46 21 1 0 2.17% 0.00% 
Ireland-Rep 1,484 627 8 4 0.54% 0.64% 
Isle of Man 80 53 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Israel 973 519 3 0 0.31% 0.00% 
Italy 4,643 1,451 32 7 0.69% 0.48% 
Ivory Coast 51 18 3 3 5.88% 16.67% 
Jamaica 65 32 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Japan 2,181 1,043 21 5 0.96% 0.48% 
Jersey 108 60 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Jordan 144 60 2 0 1.39% 0.00% 
Kazakhstan 303 136 8 3 2.64% 2.21% 
Kenya 89 30 1 0 1.12% 0.00% 
Kuwait 51 21 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Kyrgyzstan 72 41 1 0 1.39% 0.00% 
Latvia 314 64 7 2 2.23% 3.13% 
Lebanon 61 18 1 1 1.64% 5.56% 
Lithuania 418 125 5 1 1.20% 0.80% 
Luxembourg 575 220 6 2 1.04% 0.91% 
Macau 104 63 2 0 1.92% 0.00% 
Macedonia 110 31 4 2 3.64% 6.45% 
Malaysia 1,467 711 14 4 0.95% 0.56% 
Malta 58 33 1 1 1.72% 3.03% 
Mauritius 104 41 1 0 0.96% 0.00% 
Mexico 2,015 917 13 0 0.65% 0.00% 
Moldova 65 23 1 0 1.54% 0.00% 
Monaco 73 33 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Mongolia 122 69 1 0 0.82% 0.00% 
Morocco 161 74 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Mozambique 81 40 2 1 2.47% 2.50% 
Namibia 86 41 1 0 1.16% 0.00% 
Neth Antilles 68 22 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Netherlands 4,457 1,542 24 6 0.54% 0.39% 
New Zealand 1,683 740 13 7 0.77% 0.95% 
Nicaragua 67 31 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Nigeria 143 58 4 0 2.80% 0.00% 
Norway 2,352 889 26 10 1.11% 1.12% 
Oman 81 26 2 1 2.47% 3.85% 
Pakistan 165 74 8 2 4.85% 2.70% 
Panama 181 87 3 2 1.66% 2.30% 
Papua N Guinea 152 91 2 2 1.32% 2.20% 
Paraguay 54 20 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
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Peru 715 376 5 3 0.70% 0.80% 
Philippines 892 442 3 1 0.34% 0.23% 
Poland 2,114 826 12 5 0.57% 0.61% 
Portugal 983 353 6 1 0.61% 0.28% 
Puerto Rico 269 108 2 2 0.74% 1.85% 
Qatar 50 15 1 0 2.00% 0.00% 
Rep of Congo 44 24 1 1 2.27% 4.17% 
Romania 793 294 3 2 0.38% 0.68% 
Russian Fed 3,229 675 20 3 0.62% 0.44% 
Saudi Arabia 173 44 2 0 1.16% 0.00% 
Serbia 159 57 4 4 2.52% 7.02% 
Serbia & Mont. 122 62 5 2 4.10% 3.23% 
Singapore 2,226 1,223 12 5 0.54% 0.41% 
Slovak Rep 408 109 3 0 0.74% 0.00% 
Slovenia 155 50 2 1 1.29% 2.00% 
South Africa 1,462 671 15 7 1.03% 1.04% 
South Korea 1,389 783 10 6 0.72% 0.77% 
Spain 4,374 1,578 44 19 1.01% 1.20% 
Sri Lanka 147 58 4 3 2.72% 5.17% 
Sweden 3,826 1,305 62 12 1.62% 0.92% 
Switzerland 3,068 767 17 3 0.55% 0.39% 
Taiwan 854 434 5 2 0.59% 0.46% 
Tanzania 112 42 4 2 3.57% 4.76% 
Thailand 1,227 599 22 12 1.79% 2.00% 
Trinidad&Tob 69 29 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Tunisia 105 34 0 0 0.00% 0.00% 
Turkey 1,032 401 6 3 0.58% 0.75% 
Uganda 64 17 1 0 1.56% 0.00% 
Ukraine 1,132 186 16 5 1.41% 2.69% 
United Kingdom 15,260 6,648 140 56 0.92% 0.84% 
United States 24,338 12,498 146 67 0.60% 0.54% 
Uruguay 168 56 3 0 1.79% 0.00% 
Utd Arab Em 392 133 7 2 1.79% 1.50% 
Uzbekistan 91 43 4 2 4.40% 4.65% 
Venezuela 349 142 7 3 2.01% 2.11% 
Vietnam 560 238 7 1 1.25% 0.42% 
Yugoslavia 58 28 3 1 5.17% 3.57% 
Zambia 90 42 5 1 5.56% 2.38% 
Zimbabwe 102 41 4 0 3.92% 0.00% 
       
Total 172,158 72,047 1,529 602     
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Table 3 
Private and Government Cross-Border Acquisitions by Industry 
This table presents the number of M&A deals by deal type for each of the Fama and French 49 industry classifications. G/P CROSS-BORDER 
is the ratio of government cross-border deals to private cross-border deals for a given industry. The “Total” sample includes all 
deals and the “Value Disclosed” sample includes only those deals with deal value disclosed in SDC Platinum from 1985-2012.  
  PRIVATE CROSS- BORDER   GOVERNMENT CROSS-BORDER   G/P CROSS-BORDER 
FF49 Total # of Deals Value Disclosed   Total # of Deals Value Disclosed   Total # of Deals Value Disclosed 
1 1,353 520  6 4  0.44% 0.77% 
2 4,088 1,521  11 4  0.27% 0.26% 
3 1,292 532  2 1  0.15% 0.19% 
4 1,487 661  21 9  1.41% 1.36% 
5 241 126  3 0  1.24% 0.00% 
6 1,122 481  1 1  0.09% 0.21% 
7 2,142 963  9 3  0.42% 0.31% 
8 2,303 741  4 0  0.17% 0.00% 
9 3,034 1,158  8 0  0.26% 0.00% 
10 1,067 425  2 2  0.19% 0.47% 
11 1,230 546  2 1  0.16% 0.18% 
12 1,801 838  4 3  0.22% 0.36% 
13 4,321 2,190  13 4  0.30% 0.18% 
14 5,378 1,826  39 11  0.73% 0.60% 
15 1,959 728  5 2  0.26% 0.27% 
16 1,221 506  8 4  0.66% 0.79% 
17 5,074 2,047  21 7  0.41% 0.34% 
18 2,518 954  21 9  0.83% 0.94% 
19 3,096 1,325  32 21  1.03% 1.58% 
20 775 261  1 1  0.13% 0.38% 
21 5,692 2,030  29 12  0.51% 0.59% 
22 1,965 771  5 1  0.25% 0.13% 
23 3,248 1,235  31 13  0.95% 1.05% 
24 474 196  15 3  3.16% 1.53% 
25 508 191  7 2  1.38% 1.05% 
26 155 45  16 0  10.32% 0.00% 
27 3,907 2,537  19 13  0.49% 0.51% 
28 3,705 2,292  80 56  2.16% 2.44% 
29 964 546  14 10  1.45% 1.83% 
30 5,889 2,939  184 72  3.12% 2.45% 
31 3,426 1,653  117 49  3.42% 2.96% 
32 5,994 2,737  84 41  1.40% 1.50% 
33 1,726 560  4 0  0.23% 0.00% 
34 16,619 5,457  63 17  0.38% 0.31% 
35 1,507 694  3 0  0.20% 0.00% 
36 12,670 5,005  30 8  0.24% 0.16% 
37 4,913 2,411  31 16  0.63% 0.66% 
38 1,713 733  4 1  0.23% 0.14% 
39 2,159 897  3 1  0.14% 0.11% 
40 708 298  0 0  0.00% 0.00% 
41 6,625 2,383  202 48  3.05% 2.01% 
42 8,623 2,893  31 14  0.36% 0.48% 
43 4,459 1,705  23 5  0.52% 0.29% 
44 2,958 1,532  17 7  0.57% 0.46% 
45 5,740 2,535  126 49  2.20% 1.93% 
46 3,831 1,582  24 7  0.63% 0.44% 
47 4,638 2,881  45 22  0.97% 0.76% 
48 10,105 4,274  86 37  0.85% 0.87% 
49 1,271 507   15 10   1.18% 1.97% 
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Table 4 
Ratio of Government to Private Cross-Border Acquisitions by Year 
This table presents G/P CROSS-BORDER, which is the ratio of government cross-border deals to private cross-border deals 
globally, for each year in the sample in percent form. The “Total” sample includes all M&A deals and the “Value Disclosed” 
sample includes only those deals with deal value disclosed in SDC Platinum from 1985-2012.  
Year G/P CROSS-BORDER TOTAL G/P CROSS-BORDER VALUE DISCLOSED 
1985 0.65 0 
1986 2.26 2.5 
1987 1.21 1.42 
1988 1.23 0.82 
1989 0.81 0.83 
1990 1.14 0.91 
1991 1.42 0.96 
1992 1.28 1.42 
1993 1.9 2.03 
1994 1.15 1.55 
1995 0.82 0.52 
1996 0.73 0.83 
1997 0.96 1.09 
1998 0.91 1.02 
1999 1 0.68 
2000 0.9 1.08 
2001 0.96 1.01 
2002 0.96 1.09 
2003 0.93 0.71 
2004 1.02 0.88 
2005 0.89 0.76 
2006 0.63 0.62 
2007 0.83 0.8 
2008 1.18 1.4 
2009 1.81 2.26 
2010 1.36 0.14 
2011 0.42 0.39 
2012 0.54 0.64 
Mean 1.07 1.01 
Median 0.96 0.90 
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Table 5 
Data Characteristics 
Panel A reports the number of observations, the mean, median, minimum, maximum, and the standard deviation of 
the variables in our analysis. Panel B reports correlation coefficients across the variables defined in Appendix B. 
Correlations significant at the 5% level denoted by *.Variable are as defined in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  N Mean Median Min Max SD 
Government Cross-Border 644,965 0.002 0 0 1 0.045 
% Stake Sought 644,965 80.272 100 3.70 100 32.487 
Cash Only 644,965 0.324 0 0 1 0.468 
Stock Only 644,965 0.024 0 0 1 0.154 
Value of Transaction 272,428 0.127 0.016 0.001 2.732 0.373 
Failed Deal 644,965 0.213 0 0 1 0.410 
GDP Target 592,212 27410 27559 140 186243 14649 
Liberalization Target 558,997 0.892 1 0 1 0.261 
Legality Target 574,928 19.702 20.82 8.51 21.91 2.513 
Tax Haven Target 640,753 0.543 1 0 1 0.498 
Rule of Law Target 576,549 9.008 10 2.08 10 1.576 
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Panel B: Correlation 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Government Cross-Border 1           
2 % Stake Sought -0.0307 1          
3 Cash Only 0.0224 -0.2766 1         
4 Stock Only -0.0088 0.1245 -0.343 1        
5 Value of Transaction 0.018 0.0699 -0.1039 0.0182 1       
6 Failed Deal 0.0076 -0.0934 0.0052 -0.0076 -0.0236 1      
7 GDP Target -0.0086 0.1999 -0.1093 0.067 0.0919 -0.1164 1     
8 Liberalization Target -0.0099 0.2771 -0.1485 0.0932 0.0584 -0.1127 0.5486 1    
9 Legality Target -0.0134 0.2485 -0.1532 0.1045 0.0361 -0.0908 0.6488 0.8225 1   
10 Tax Haven Target -0.0164 0.2078 -0.1558 0.0976 0.0329 -0.1301 0.3531 0.2637 0.3578 1  
11 Rule of Law Target -0.0117 0.2415 -0.1508 0.1334 0.0499 -0.0917 0.6473 0.8304 0.9442 0.2858 1 
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Table 6 
Variable Means, Medians, and Tests of Difference by Government Cross-Border 
This table reports the mean and median for each variable in our analysis for two samples: government cross-border deals, and all other deals. A t-test (Government – all other 
deals) and Wilcoxon Rank Sum test are conducted to determine if the variables for the two samples are equal. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
      Government CB     All Other Deals     
Variable   N Mean  Median   N  Mean Median T-Test 
Wilcoxon 
Rank Sum 
% Sought  1,307 57.46% 50.00%  643,658 80.32% 100% -25.42*** -25.38*** 
Cash Only  1,531 0.40 0  695,163 0.32 0 6.21*** 6.21*** 
Stock Only  1,531 0.00 0  695,163 0.02 0 -5.53*** -5.53*** 
Transaction Value  602 0.279 0.044  287,051 0.125 0.0166 10.18*** 10.37*** 
Failed Deal  1,531 0.38 0  695,163 0.23 0 14.34*** 14.35*** 
GDP Target   1,413 22,544.58 22,946.10  636,822 27,253.33 27,172.90 -12.01*** -12.14*** 
Liberalization Target  1,137 0.81 0.72  601,937 0.89 1 -10.69*** -8.59*** 
Legality Target  1,222 18.76 20.41  618,972 19.67 20.82 -12.52*** -10.56*** 
Tax Haven Target  1,443 0.36 0  690,473 0.54 1 -13.33*** -13.34*** 
Rule of Law Target   1,229 8.41 8.22   620,688 8.99 8.57 -12.75*** -13.17*** 
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Table 7 
Government Opportunity Set 
This table presents the number of government cross-border M&A deals based on various deal characteristics. Above (Below) 
Median Institutional refers to all deals involving a target nation with greater than (less than or equal to) median scores in both the 
liberalization and legality variables. Liberalization Target is the liberalization intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert 
et al. (2005). Legality Target is the legality index from La Porta et al. (1998).Culture Index is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the target nation and acquirer nation have difference major language and different major religions and zero otherwise. Above 
(Below) Median PR refers to all deals involving an acquirer and target nation with political relations greater than (less than or equal 
to) the median political relations score for all cross-border deals in the sample.PR is the political relations between the acquirer and 
target nation measured by the distance between UN voting records for a given bilateral pair. The sample includes all M&A deals 
(i.e., acquirer n from nation j into target nation “i”) from SDC Platinum from 1985-2012. 
  Culture Index = 1 Culture Index = 0 
Above Median Institutional 187  99  
Below Median Institutional 268  275  
   
 Above Median PR Below Median PR 
Above Median Institutional 284  2  
Below Median Institutional 500  43  
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Table 8 
Government Opportunity Set: Deal-Level Probit 
This table presents the results of the following probit regression: .arg ,,321,, jinijin YetGDPTDealG   The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if a deal involves 
a government acquirer (i.e., G=1) in a cross-border deal or a zero otherwise for acquirer n from nation j in target nation i. Deal is a vector of deal characteristics. % Stake Sought, 
which is the percent of the target firm sought by the acquirer in a given deal. Cash Only and Stock Only are indicator variables that take the value of one if the offer type of the deal 
is all cash or all stock, respectively. Value of Transaction is the U.S. dollar value of the deal in billions. Failed Deal is an indicator equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero 
otherwise. GDP Target is the gross domestic product per capita of the target nation. Y is a vector of target nation institutional characteristics. Liberalization Target is the liberalization 
intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Legality Target and Rule of Law Target are the legality index and measure of law and order, respectively, both 
from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to one if the target nation is classified as an offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by target nation and all specification include year indicators. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample includes all M&A deals (i.e., acquirer n from nation j into target nation “i”) from SDC Platinum from 1985-2012. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
% Stake Sought -0.003***        -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000)        (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Only 0.020        0.014 0.018 0.024 0.016 
 (0.018)        (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Stock Only -0.338***        -0.256*** -0.265*** -0.283*** -0.262*** 
 (0.090)        (0.075) (0.078) (0.075) (0.075) 
Value of Transaction  0.001***           
  (0.000)           
Failed Deal   0.154***      0.097*** 0.096*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 
   (0.034)      (0.026) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) 
GDP Target    -0.005***     -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 
    (0.002)     (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Liberalization Target     -0.169***    -0.004    
     (0.046)    (0.053)    
Legality Target      -0.020***    -0.014**   
      (0.004)    (0.007)   
Tax Haven Target       -0.142***    -0.095***  
       (0.049)    (0.034)  
Rule of Law Target        -0.034***    -0.021** 
        (0.008)    (0.009) 
Observations 644,965 287,653 696,694 638,235 603,074 620,194 691,916 621,917 522,521 535,661 589,384 537,136 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0375 0.0204 0.0158 0.0129 0.0150 0.0166 0.0166 0.0172 0.0482 0.0517 0.0474 0.0515 
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Table 9 
Government Opportunity Set: Deal Level Bivariate Probit 
This table presents the results of the following bivariate probit regression: .arg ,,321,, jinijin YetGDPTDealG   The two dependent variables are indicators equal to one if 
a deal is cross-border (CB) or involves a government acquirer and is cross-border (GOVCB). Deal is a vector of deal characteristics. % Stake Sought is the percent of the target firm 
sought by the acquirer in a given deal. Cash Only and Stock Only are indicator variables that take the value of one if the offer type of the deal is all cash or all stock, respectively. 
Value of Transaction is the U.S. dollar value of the deal in billions. Failed Deal is an indicator equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. GDP Target is the gross 
domestic product per capita of the target nation. Y is a vector of target nation institutional characteristics. Liberalization Target is the liberalization intensity measure for the target 
nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Legality Target and Rule of Law Target are the legality index and measure of law and order, respectively, both from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax 
Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to one if the target nation is classified as an offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. Bold coefficients indicate that the 
coefficients of the two groups are statistically different at a minimum of the 5% level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by target 
nation and all specification include year indicators. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample includes all M&A deals from SDC 
Platinum from 1985-2012. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB 
% Stake Sought -0.306* -0.543***           
 (0.168) (0.093)           
Cash Only 4.209 4.838           
 (4.487) (3.214)           
Stock Only -41.500*** -65.815***           
 (11.349) (9.535)           
Value of 
Transaction   0.127* 0.218***         
   (0.070) (0.050)         
Failed Deal     7.410 23.802***       
     (5.724) (3.960)       
GDP Target       -1.045*** -0.636**     
       (0.384) (0.286)     
Liberalization 
Target         -50.709** -29.695**   
         (24.109) (12.998)   
Legality Target           -6.110** -3.333*** 
           (2.414) (1.279) 
Tax Haven Target             
             
Rule of Law Target             
             
Constant -0.453*** -2.503*** -0.681*** -2.904*** -0.693*** -2.918*** -0.409*** -2.686*** -0.296** -2.643*** 0.459 -2.240*** 
 (0.075) (0.049) (0.117) (0.071) (0.152) (0.075) (0.081) (0.054) (0.134) (0.070) (0.368) (0.190) 
Observations 644,965 644,965 287,653 287,653 696,694 696,694 638,235 638,235 603,074 603,074 620,194 620,194 
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Chi-Square 264.2 264.2 59.25 59.25 43.11 43.11 7.590 7.590 5.222 5.222 6.956 6.956 
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Table 9 Ctd. 
 (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) 
 CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB CB GOVCB 
% Stake Sought     -0.259** -0.548*** -0.240* -0.550*** -0.168* -0.487*** -0.233** -0.546*** 
     (0.128) (0.080) (0.128) (0.079) (0.098) (0.066) (0.115) (0.073) 
Cash Only     6.250* 4.985 5.946 5.758* 6.894 6.181* 5.812 5.488* 
     (3.550) (3.122) (3.829) (2.963) (6.014) (3.593) (4.015) (3.009) 
Stock Only     -40.346*** -62.659*** -37.469*** -62.245*** -32.414*** -60.550*** -35.021*** -61.538*** 
     (9.298) (9.471) (9.821) (9.650) (7.656) (7.612) (9.278) (9.600) 
Value of 
Transaction             
             
Failed Deal     3.614 23.608*** 2.429 22.465*** -0.486 17.520*** 2.308 22.294*** 
     (3.663) (3.054) (4.054) (2.809) (5.815) (4.612) (3.729) (2.892) 
GDP Target     -0.270 -0.091 0.013 0.043 -0.214 0.031 0.066 0.076 
     (0.287) (0.201) (0.275) (0.207) (0.201) (0.163) (0.361) (0.197) 
Liberalization 
Target     -30.903 -6.141       
     (20.601) (9.962)       
Legality Target       -5.252** -1.684     
       (2.203) (1.056)     
Tax Haven Target -49.897*** -22.553**       -48.485*** -22.179**   
 (16.480) (11.437)       (14.531) (9.665)   
Rule of Law Target   -10.608** -5.731**       -9.608* -3.225 
   (4.614) (2.455)       (5.101) (2.404) 
Constant -0.442*** -2.762*** 0.212 -2.381*** -0.211 -2.507*** 0.455 -2.261*** -0.284*** -2.510*** 0.266 -2.314*** 
 (0.045) (0.035) (0.321) (0.165) (0.153) (0.093) (0.376) (0.191) (0.084) (0.067) (0.367) (0.195) 
Observations 691,916 691,916 621,917 621,917 522,521 522,521 535,661 535,661 589,384 589,384 537,136 537,136 
Chi-Square 13.84 13.84 5.583 5.583 348.5 348.5 334.6 334.6 993.7 993.7 324.1 324.1 
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Table 10 
Government Opportunity Set: Deal Level Probit Cross-Border Sample 
This table presents the results of the following probit regression: .arg ,,32,,1,, jiniijinjin YetGDPTDealG   The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if a deal involves a 
government acquirer (i.e., G=1) in a cross-border deal or a zero otherwise for acquirer n from nation j in target nation i. Deal is a vector of deal characteristics. % Stake Sought is the percent of the target 
firm sought by the acquirer in a given deal. Cash Only and Stock Only are indicator variables that take the value of one if the offer type of the deal is all cash or all stock, respectively. Value of Transaction 
is the U.S. dollar value of the deal in billions. Failed Deal is an indicator equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. GDP Target is the gross domestic product per capita of the target 
nation. Y is a vector of target nation institutional characteristics. Liberalization Target is the liberalization intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Legality Target and Rule of 
Law Target are the legality index and measure of law and order, respectively, both from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to one if the target nation is classified as an 
offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Culture Index is an indicator variable equal to one if the target nation and acquirer nation have 
difference major language and different major religions and zero otherwise.PR is the political relations between the acquirer and target nation measured by the distance between UN voting records for a 
given bilateral pair. Standard errors are clustered by target nation and all specification include year indicators. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample 
includes all M&A deals (i.e., acquirer n from nation j into target nation “i”) from SDC Platinum from 1985-2012. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
% Stake Sought -0.009***    -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
 (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cash Only 0.071    0.048 0.052 0.099* 0.056 0.113** 0.074 0.074 0.109* 0.062 
 (0.060)    (0.037) (0.038) (0.057) (0.037) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.056) (0.054) 
Stock Only -1.105***    -0.574*** -0.527** -0.913*** -0.548*** -0.803** -0.975*** -0.976*** -1.003*** -0.320** 
 (0.292)    (0.223) (0.217) (0.295) (0.211) (0.314) (0.285) (0.285) (0.352) (0.160) 
Value of Transaction  0.004***            
  (0.001)            
Failed Deal   0.532***  0.222*** 0.187*** 0.386*** 0.194*** 0.405*** 0.359*** 0.360*** 0.432*** 0.260*** 
   (0.092)  (0.066) (0.063) (0.070) (0.062) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.077) (0.058) 
GDP Difference    0.004 -0.010** -0.008 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 0.002 
    (0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
Liberalization 
Difference     0.003         
     (0.002)         
Legality Difference      0.017        
      (0.026)        
Tax Haven 
Difference       -0.004*       
       (0.002)       
Rule of Law 
Difference        -0.000      
        (0.000)      
Language Difference         0.005***     
         (0.001)     
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Religion Difference  
 
       0.006***    
         (0.002)    
Culture Index           0.006***   
           (0.002)   
Geographic Distance            -0.174  
            (0.297)  
PR             0.005*** 
             (0.002) 
Observations 158,325 72,816 173,927 151,693 107,379 111,341 135,956 112,325 138,284 138,284 138,284 138,284 67,159 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0322 0.0215 0.0174 0.00712 0.0338 0.0308 0.0419 0.0308 0.0447 0.0463 0.0461 0.0379 0.0616 
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Table 11 
Government Opportunity Set: Failed Deal Probit 
This table presents the results of the following probit regression: .arg ,,32,,1,, jiniijinjin YetGDPTDealF   The dependent variable is an indicator equal to one if the deal 
is not completed and zero otherwise for acquirer n from nation j in target nation i. Deal is a vector of deal characteristics. Government Cross-border is an indicator equal to one if a 
deal involves a government acquirer in a cross-border deal or a zero otherwise. % Stake Sought is the percent of the target firm sought by the acquirer in a given deal. Cash Only and 
Stock Only are indicator variables that take the value of one if the offer type of the deal is all cash or all stock, respectively. Value of Transaction is the U.S. dollar value of the deal 
in billions. Failed Deal is an indicator equal to one if the deal is not completed and zero otherwise. GDP Target is the gross domestic product per capita of the target nation. Y is a 
vector of target nation institutional characteristics. Liberalization Target is the liberalization intensity measure for the target nation from Bekaert et al. (2005). Legality Target and 
Rule of Law Target are the legality index and measure of law and order, respectively, both from La Porta et al. (1998). Tax Haven Target is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
target nation is classified as an offshore financial center by IMF and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered by target nation 
and all specification include year indicators. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The sample includes all M&A deals (i.e., acquirer n from 
nation j into target nation “i”) from SDC Platinum from 1985-2012. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Government Cross-border 0.116*** 0.081** 0.136*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 0.134*** 0.142*** 0.130*** 0.123*** 0.105*** 0.122*** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021) (0.023) (0.022) 
% Stake Sought -0.058**       -0.009 -0.023* -0.009 -0.023* 
 (0.026)       (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014) 
Cash Only 0.455       -3.177*** -2.621*** -0.880 -2.612*** 
 (2.009)       (0.560) (0.682) (1.283) (0.681) 
Stock Only 6.272**       6.327** 6.418** 7.399*** 6.620*** 
 (2.641)       (2.708) (2.588) (2.588) (2.511) 
Value of Transaction  -0.026          
  (0.020)          
GDP Target   -0.393***     -0.054 -0.189 -0.344*** -0.180 
   (0.115)     (0.094) (0.152) (0.125) (0.142) 
Liberalization Target    -16.625***    -13.574***    
    (2.059)    (3.742)    
Legality Target     -1.502***    -0.528   
     (0.267)    (0.637)   
Tax Haven Target      -6.473*    -1.524  
      (3.398)    (2.325)  
Rule of Law Target       -2.364***    -0.927 
       (0.439)    (1.015) 
Observations 644,965 287,653 638,235 603,074 620,194 691,916 621,917 522,521 535,661 589,384 537,136 
Chi-Square 0.0175 0.0422 0.0316 0.0267 0.0225 0.0200 0.0221 0.0227 0.0193 0.0307 0.0194 
 
